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CROSS THE LINE IN THE GLOBAL
HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME?: THE
CHARLIE HEBDO CONTROVERSY AND
ITS IMPLICATION FOR CREATING A
NEW PARADIGM TO ASSESS THE
BOUNDS OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION
Kwanghyuk Yoo*
A human right can only be found upon this Natural Law, and
the great principle which governs both the one and the other
throughout the world is this: Do unto others as you would have
done unto yourself.1
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INTRODUCTION
n November 13, 2015, Paris was in a state of complete pandemonium due to a terrorist attack. This fatal attack committed by radical Islamists resulted in approximately 130 innoQent deaths and was reported to be 9the /ost deadly assault on
French soil since World War UUZ82 While this tragic attack evoked
worldwide public indignation, the ideological dissension controversy behind this atrocity leaves room for further theoretical discourse.
Our modern times rest on a firm basis of the spirit of tolerance
that calls upon us to acknowledge and accommodate disparate

O

2. See Anthony Faiola & Souad Mekhennet, Paris Attacks Were Carried
Out By Three Groups Tied to Islamic State, Official Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 15,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/string-of-paris-terrorist-attacks-leaves-over-120-dead/2015/11/14/066df55c-8a73-11e5-bd91d385b244482f_story.html.
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ideas, cultures, or religions of others. Over the past 250 years,
this spirit served as an ideological foundation propelling civil
campaigns for liberal democracy after French philosopher, Francois-Marie Arouet, better known for his pen name, Voltaire, mordantly criticized contemporary society throughout his famous
booH 9Treaties on ToleranQe,8 Lor its prevalent tendenQy to resist
deviation from generally accepted thought.3 While the virtue of
tolerance is taken for granted today, a recent high-profile incident that also occurred in France ten months before the November 2015 Paris attack deserves special attention, as it posed the
crucial question of whether, and to what extent, intolerance
should be tolerated. This tragic terrorist attack, otherwise
known as the Charlie Hebdo shooting, occurred on January 7,
2015, and shattered deep-rooted complacency about the absolute
protection of freedom of expression and manifested the ideological and cultural conflict between Islam and the West.4 In the attack, at least two armed men of Muslim faith shot to death
twelve people at the Paris headquarters of the newspaper, Charlie Hebdo, which had previously published what was intended to
be a satirical cartoon of the prophet Mohammad.5 This act of terrorism is described as a reaction by extremists with Islamic
backgrounds to a blasphemous depiction, which seems to have
insulted their cultural and ethnical identity or represented Islamophobia at the extreme. But what genuinely matters is that
the Charlie Hebdo incident invites controversy over the legitimate purview of human rights beyond factual inquiries into the
incident. This incident drew waves of public attention and sympathy, not merely because it forced society to face fears of brutal
terrorism but also because it served as a reminder of the violable
nature of human rights. While the global community has doubtlessly understood that the Charlie Hebdo shooting was an intolerable, material threat to the fundamental human right of freedom of expression, analysis of the incident undermines the certainty that international human rights law generally protects
3. VOLTAIRE, supra note 1.
4. See Maayan Lubell, Thousands of Palestinians Protest Charlie Hebdo
Mohammad Cartoon, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/24/us-france-shooting-palestinians-idUSKBN0KX0M920150124.
5. See Dan Bilefsky & Maia de la Baume, Terrorists Strike Charlie Hebdo
Newspaper in Paris, Leaving 12 Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-paris-shooting.html?_r=0, at A1.
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such a right. A close, second look of well-established principles
of freedom of expression and cultural relativism invites careful
reconsideration of conventional statutory limitations on freedom
of expression. Consequently, it follows that the legitimate implementation of those principles may call for reconceptualization of
freedom of expression, to an extent that it is interpreted as being
subject to further normative limitations from a socio-legal perspective, so long as the seemingly genuine exercise of such freedom is found to have in effect crossed the line demarcated by the
social integrity standard in the cultural relativism context. This
insight derived from the Charlie Hebdo controversy proposes
that freedom of expression should be rigorously circumscribed
within narrower bounds when it is detrimentally in conflict with
social integrity. It may be under this circumstance that a
stronger chilling effect on freedom of expression is deemed licit
under the global human rights regime.
This article raises the fundamental question of whether international human rights law has the legitimate right to reject cultural intolerance. The article does not intentionally criticize or
discount Islamic or Western ideologies. Nor does it aim to challenge current international human rights standards; rather, it
attempts to propose a new paradigm of the legitimate scope of
freedom of expression in the context of heterogeneous ideological
conflict. Thus, this article posits that human rights have both
universal and relative attributes, and that, ultimately, cultural
relativism should play a role in the delimitation of freedom of
expression. In pursuit of this objective, Part I of the article will
review the factual background of the Charlie Hebdo incident,
clarifying the hotly debated human rights issue of freedom of expression. Part II of the article will provide a general discussion
of freedom of expression under the international human rights
law. This Part will examine freedom of expression guaranteed
by various international instruments established under both the
United Nations and other regional regimes. It will also provide
clarification that all human rights and freedoms are subject to
universal enjoyment and exercise, in that everyone is entitled to
the same rights and freedom without any discrimination on such
grounds as race, sex, color, language, religion, natural or social
origin, and economic status. Part III of the article will pinpoint
the statutory limitations on freedom of expression in the context
of the relative attribute of human rights. This discussion will be
based on the distinction between universal respect for human
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rights and their absolute protection. This Part will provide a detailed discussion in the international plane and case law, which
helps to identify specific circumstances where freedom of expression is subject to statutory limitations. Part IV of the article will
address legal issues of the relative universality of human rights
by canvassing the concept of cultural relativism and presenting
a 9soQial integrity8 standard, as derived from the context of intra- and inter- societal relations. This Part will show that cultural relativism should serve as the key threshold in deciding
whether freedom of expression is subject to statutory restrictions in enjoyment and exercise. It will subsequently stress
the significance of taking into account the possibility of impediment to the fundamental social integration as an essential criterion to assess the normative admissibility of the cultural relativism threshold. Finally, the conclusion of this article will summarize the foregoing detailed discussions, stress the significance of
guiding rules identified in such discussions, and carefully evaluate the Charlie Hebdo controversy as framed by the relative
universality of human rights under those rules. By doing so, the
article will derive underlying implications for creating a new
paradigm to assess the bounds of freedom of expression.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CHARLIE HEBDO INCIDENT
This Part will provide a detailed account of the Charlie Hebdo
incident, discussing who was involved, what occurred, and the
impact that it had on innocent lives. It will also reveal Charlie
Hebdo’s prior use of satire against the Islamic faith. This Part
will continue by explaining how the Charlie Hebdo incident fits
into the larger debate surrounding the scope of freedom of expression protected under international human rights law.
A. Factual Background of the Charlie Hebdo Incident
The terrorists who perpetrated the Charlie Hebdo attack were
three young men in their thirtiesKbrothers Cherif and Said
Kouachi, who were of Algerian descent,6 and Amedy Coulibaly,

6. See Paris Attacks: Suspects’ Profiles, BBCNEWS (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30722038.
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a French citizen of Malian parentage.7 In their three days of violence, the Kouachi brothers attacked the Charlie Hebdo offices,
killing twelve people, while Coulibaly murdered four hostages at
a kosher supermarket on January 9, 2015.8 In the wake of this
tragic two-pronged attack, people all around the world held solidarity rallies to commemorate the victims. Additionally, on January 11, 2015, around 3.7 million people and forty world leadersKincluding French President, Francois Hollande, British
Prime Minister, David Cameron, German Chancellor, Angela
Merkel, and Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano RajoyKmarched
in antiterrorism rallies in Paris and elsewhere in France. Reportedly, the Parisian march constituted the largest mass gathering in French history.9 Many carried signs depicting the nowLa/ous phrase, 9Je suis Charlie _U #/ !harlie^,8 in honor oL the
victimized journalists.10 This simple phrase implied various political messages, depending on the interpretation of the words
9U8 and 9!harlieZ8 While 9U8 /ay /ean individuals Qo//e/orat[
ing the victims, French nationals, or citizens in support of demoQratiQ govern/ent, 9!harlie8 /ay reLer to individual viQti/s,
the magazine Charlie Hebdo, or freedom of expression generally.
In opposition to this phrase, a /inority oL /arQhers Qhanted, 9U
a/ not !harlieZ8 The signiLiQanQe oL the Charlie Hebdo incident
transcends the individual terrorist attacks. The declarationsK
9U #/ !harlie8 and 9U #/ not !harlie8Khold a lens to the severe
tension of the long-standing conflict between Islamic and Western cultures. At the core of this conflict is the tension between
freedom of expression and ideological censorship.
Charlie Hebdo, formerly known as Hara-Kiri Hebdo, began as
a weeHly publiQation in F>AXZ The ter/ 9Hara-Siri8 Qo/es Lro/
the Tapanese ter/ Lor 9ritual suiQide by dise/bowel/ent praQ[
ticed by the Japanese samurai or formerly decreed by a court in
7. See “That was Just the First Amedy Coulibaly,” CBSNEWS (Jan. 19,
2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/paris-terror-attacker-amedy-coulibalyradicalized-in-french-housing-project/.
8. See Charlie Hebdo Attack: Three Days of Terror, BBCNEWS (Jan. 14,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237.
9. See Ashley Fantz, Array of World Leaders Joins 3.7 Million in France to
Defy
Terrorism,
CNN
(Jan.
12,
2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/11/world/charlie-hebdo-paris-march/.
10. See Kim Willsher, Alexandra Topping & Anne Penketh, Paris Anti-Terror Rally: All Religions, Ages and Nations in Massive Show of Unity, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/11/paris-franceanti-terror-rally-massive-show-unity.

2017]

Charlie Hebdo and Freedom of Expression

767

lieu oL the death penaltyZ811 The French government forced
Hara-Kiri Hebdo to suspend publication several times in response to the publiQation’s i//oderate satires on soQiety and
culture. In 1986, Hara-Kiri Hebdo ceased publication after it satirized the death of former French president Charles de Gaulle.
Shortly afterward, Charlie Hebdo replaced Hara-Kiri Hebdo and
continued to publish vulgar and obscene articles with satirical
cartoons. Religious and political groups alike have vigorously denounced the magazine.
For example, in February 2006, Charlie Hebdo published a
headline titled, Mohammad Overwhelmed by Fundamentalism,
which was accompanied by an illustration of the prophet Muhammad carrying a bomb in his turban, analogous to a cartoon
published by the Danish daily newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, in
September 2005. Because Islam has a tradition of aniconismK
an opposition to the use of icons or visual images to depict living
creatures or religious figures12KIslamic groups considered the
depiction blasphemous. The Charlie Hebdo cartoon offended
many Muslims and led to violent protests and a class action lawsuit against Charlie Hebdo. The suit argued that these cartoons
were discriminatory against Muslims. Charlie Hebdo contended,
however, that Islamist religious collectivism, like Nazism and
fascism, threatened democracy. In 2011, Charlie Hebdo published a special edition issue titled Charia Hebdo, a play on
words mocking Islamic Sharia law, which is notorious for harsh
punishment. Further, one headline in the issue threatened jokingly: 9FXX lashes iL you don’t die oL laughterZ8 This Qartoon also
satirized the possibility that Tunisia might be ruled by Sharia
law because, in 2011, Arab fundamentalists in Tunisia overthrew a dictatorship and came to power in a citizen uprising,
later dubbed the 9#rab :pringZ813 Subsequently, inflamed Muslims destroyed Charlie Hebdo’s oLfice by committing arson. In
response, French citizens criticized the attack on Charlie Hebdo,
deeming it to be a threat against freedom of expression and unacceptable under any circumstances.

11. See Hara-kiri Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hara-kiri (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
12. See Aniconism Definition, BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/25453/aniconism (last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
13. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
56 (3rd ed. 2013).
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In September 2012, a subsequent Charlie Hebdo cartoon differed notably from its infamous predecessors. The satire of Muhammad quickly escalated, as one headline, Intouchables 2, included a cartoon of an orthodox Jewish man pushing a crippled
Muslim in a wheelchair and, perhaps more polemically, a naked
Muhammad striking a pornographic pose. The public criticized
this satire for crossing the line from permissible to inappropriate, and even politicians called for restraint on Charlie Hebdo’s
satires. The 2015 terrorist attack eventually reversed public
opinion, as the public has strongly condemned this attack as
suppressing and destroying the French and global democratic
spirit.
B. Clarifying the Human Rights Issue at the Heart of the
Charlie Hebdo Incident
Terrorism itself is no doubt unlawful and unjustified for any
reason. The Charlie Hebdo incident, however, prompts more
than a discussion of terrorism. It raises the issue of whether
Charlie Hebdo’s satire on Muha//ad Lell within the sQope oL
freedom of expression protected under international human
rights law. From contradictory perspectives, this incident provokes discussions of the inherent limits of this freedom.
One analysis of this incident frames freedom of religion as a
limit on freedom of expression. Pope Francis has said that while
9to Hill in the na/e oL Vod is an aberration,8 the Laith oL others
should be beyond insult.14 This view seems to argue that freedom
of expression is neither inviolable nor an absolute value. Hence,
this freedom cannot be construed as overwhelming cultural relativity, and, furthermore, justified as the persecution of the
strong against the weak. This stance criticizes the double standard that Charlie Hebdo has implicitly taken by asserting that its
work advances democracy, freedom, and social justice. The
QatQhphrase, 9U #/ !harlie,8 striHes a Qhord re/inisQent oL 9We
are all #/eriQan,8 a phrase /any people worldwide reQited aLter
the September 11th terrorist attacks. Charlie Hebdo has published satirical cartoons instigating islamophobia but has taken
a passive attitude in criticizing Jewish issues, avoiding what
14. See Abby Ohlheiser, Pope Francis on Charlie Hebdo: “You Cannot Insult
the Faith of Others,” WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2015/01/15/pope-francis-on-charlie-hebdo-youcannot-insult-the-faith-of-others/.
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may be perceived as anti-Semitism. In 2009, Charlie Hebdo fired
its former columnist, Maurice Sinet, for his anti-Semitic commentary on the unfounded rumor that the son of the former
French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, planned to convert from Catholicism to Judaism upon his engagement to the Jewish heiress
of a large electronic goods company.15
Another analysis resists taking into account the collision of
two opposing values in pinpointing the human rights issue in
the Charlie Hebdo incident. This analysis does not interpret the
Charlie Hebdo incident as an ideological conflict between strong
Western mainstream society and a minority immigrant society.
Rather, this analysis construes this incident as confirmation
that freedom of expression at large relies on social commitment.
Those who make this observation argue that victims of the Charlie Hebdo incident knowingly risked their lives to express their
beliefs, and these observers may argue that no circumstance
should denigrate self-expression and may warn that the partial
limitation on individual freedom may lead to the complete obliteration of that freedom.
Individual views of the Charlie Hebdo incident differ in regard
to freedom of expression. As a recipient of so much media attention, the phrase 9U #/ !harlie8 brought into *uestion the uni[
versality of freedom of expression, especially among journalists.
What makes this incident so controversial? What was the cause
of this tragic terrorist attack? The answers to these questions
require delicate consideration. On the one hand, the conclusion
that Islamic extremists are responsible for this attack suggests
that Muslims are a heterogeneous social group outside the West
and the Charlie Hebdo incident is an extension of 9/11. On the
other hand, the conclusion that the Charlie Hebdo attack is an
expression of long-festering intergroup conflict within French society suggests that the enemy of the state is a group inside that
state. Neither case supports the idea that the Charlie Hebdo attack was an inevitable result of its satiric cartoons of Muhammad. Intolerance for cultural diversity and the complacent belief
about the absolute value of human rights are one way to explain
the aforementioned questions. Cultural relativity limits the
15. See Henry Samuel, French Cartoonist Sine on Trial on Charges of AntiSemitism over Sarkozy Jibe, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/4351672/French-cartoonist-Sineon-trial-on-charges-of-anti-Semitism-over-Sarkozy-jibe.html.
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scope of freedom of expression. The normative significance of cultural relativity on human rights discourse should not be understated in any event, particularly where culture forms the irreplaceable basis of a set of cardinal identities of the State and
underlies the functioning of its politics, economy, or society. Indeed, in Islamic countries, traditional culture enriched by indigenous religious values plays a pivotal role in establishing an
overarching framework for political, economic, and societal integration. For instance, Islamic culture serves the constitutional
theocracy connoting the unity of political process and religion.
As such, the reach of Islamic values holds a comprehensive
range from both functional and doctrinal perspectives. By contrast, Western cultural values are in general understood as being appreciably severed from or having limited interference with
political, economic, and societal domains. Veritably, while most
Western countries have culture whose origin has historic and religious relevance to Christianity, which in a broad sense embraces various denominations, such as Catholic, Orthodox and
Protestant, they adhere to the separation of church and state, a
principle common to their constitutions.16 Hence, it follows that
the fundamental discrepancy of the degree of cultural influence
over Islamic and Western societies explains why cultural relativity serves as a criterion to demarcate the bounds of freedom
of expression. This is because the level of cultural cohesion and
integration may dictate the substantive content of social consensus on freedom of expression. In this context, the stark contrast
between Islamic and Western cultures stokes the need to elaborate and clarify limits on freedom of expression.
II. THE UNIVERSAL RESPECT FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
This Part will examine the universal nature of human rights
by exploring the key provisions of landmark international instruments such as the U.N. Charter, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and two paramount international covenants.
16. See E. Gregory Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 485, 570 (2009). For example, the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: 9Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .8 See
U.S. CONST. amend. I. Furthermore, Article 1 of French Constitution provides:
9France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall
ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin,
race or religion. . . .8 1958 LA CONSTITUTION art. I (Fr.).
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Furthermore, this Part will discuss the general meaning and
scope of freedom of expression under international human rights
law in the context of universal respect for human rights. This
discussion will include an analysis of freedom to seek information and freedom of the press, which are characterized as fundamental human rights concomitant with freedom of expression.
A. The Universal Nature of Human Rights
The universal property of human rights stems from a belief in
the inherent dignity of being human. The Charter of the United
Nations _97ZRZ !harter8^, a treaty establishing the U.N., which
was signed in June 1945 by representatives of fifty countries in
San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization,17 declares that one of its key purposes is to
aQhieve international Qooperation 9in pro/oting and enQourag[
ing respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to raQe, sea, language, or religionZ818
Likewise, the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) unequivocally endorses the universality of human
rights.19 The UDHR represents a milestone in the contemporary
history of international human rights law and includes basic
principles on human rights, which the international community
agreed upon and committed to observe with the consensus on the
significance of universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.20 Based on this universality, the UDHR is recognized as a milestone for helping individuals across various cultures internalize the value of human rights by drawing the

17. See
History
of
the
United
Nations,
UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/ (last visited July
30, 2017).
18. See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3.
19. See RHONA K. M. SMITH, TEXTS AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (2nd ed. 2010); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, pmbl (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (9Member States
have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations,
the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.8).
20. The Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-internationalhuman-rights-law/index.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2017).
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world’s attention to hu/an rightsZ21 Article 1 of the UDHR provides: 9#ll hu/an beings are born Lree and e*ual in dignity and
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should
aQt towards one another in a spirit oL brotherhoodZ822 A variety
of subsequent international or regional instruments have confirmed and reinforced the universality of human rights that the
U.N. Charter and the UDHR embodied.
Additionally, it is noteworthy that there are two international
covenants of paramount importance, together with the UDHR in
the realm of international human rights law. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), which were both adopted in 1966,23 give legal effect
to the terms of the UDHR and confirm the spirit of the United
Rations’ value oL the universality oL human rights through almost identical phrasing of their provisions. For example, the
ICESCR states as follows:
The States Parties to the present Covenant . . . [r]ecogniz[e]
that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the idea of free human beings enjoying freedom from
fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural
rights, as well as his civil and political rights, [and the parties]
consider the obligation of States under the Charter of the
United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms.24

As such, the concept of universal human rights has formed the
basis for international human rights law for many international
instruments since its initial establishment was based on international consensus through the adoption of the UDHR. Thus,
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides
that signatory governments are obliged to respect the UDHR.25
21. See CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND
REALISM 58 (1st ed. 2003).
22. UNDHR, supra note 19, art. 1.
23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
24. See IESCR, supra note 23, at pmbl.
25. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. 11, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
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Moreover, the American Convention on Human Rights 1969 by
and large reiterates part of the statement of the ICESCR cited
above and substantially echoes it throughout the text.26 Additionally, the Final Act, which was adopted at the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975Kcommonly known
as the Helsinki Final ActKdeclares that one of the key principles
guiding relations between partiQipating states is the 9respeQt Lor
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom
of thought, conscience, religion or belieLZ827 This does not mean,
however, that the concept of human rights is immune to ideological conflict. The aforementioned instruments still allow for consideration of cultural difference in their application. Furthermore, in the late 1920s, the diffusion of cultural diversity and
the rise of state sovereignty challenged the belief that the universal value of human rights underlies all international human
rights laws.28
B. Freedom of Expression Guaranteed by International
Instruments
Since the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the
UDHR at its third session in 1948,29 the international community has joined together under both U.N. and regional human
rights regimes to adopt treaties and resolutions to ensure that
human rights receive universal protection across the world. A
variety of international instruments guarantee freedom of expression as one of the key fundamental human rights. The fol-

26. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights pmbl., Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
27. See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act (Aug.
1, 1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act]. For more information on Helsinki
Final Act, see DONNELLY, supra note 12, at 56, 95, 200N201.
28. See Anne Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism and International
Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42, 47 (1996).
29. See A Historical Record of the Drafting Process, DAG HAMMARSKJOLD
LIB., http://research.un.org/en/undhr/introduction (last visited Aug. 10, 2017).
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lowing list notes the relevant provisions of key instruments: Article 1930 and 2931 of the UDHR, adopted in 1948, Article 1932
and 2033 of the ICCPR, adopted in 1966, Article 1134 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in
2000, Article 1035 of the European Convention for the Protection
30. See UDHR, supra note 19, art. 19 (9Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers.8).
31. See id. art. 29 (91. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone
the free and full development of his personality is possible. 2. In the exercise
of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.8).
32. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 19 (91. Everyone shall have the right to
hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The
exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection
of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.8).
33. See id. art. 20 (91. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 2.
Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.8).
34. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 11, 2000
O.J. (C 364) 1 (91. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.8).
35. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 25, art. 10 (91.
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall
not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
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of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in 1950,
Article 1336 and 1437 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, adopted in 1969, Article 938 of the African Charter on
Hu/an and Peoples’ ;ights, adopted in F>?F, #rtiQle FF39 of the
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.8).
36. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights art. 13,1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (91. Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s
choice. 2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall
not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition
of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary
to ensure: (a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or (b) the protection
of national security, public order, or public health or morals. 3. The right of
expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the
abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting
frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any
other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and
opinions. 4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of
regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence. 5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other
similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including
those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as
offenses punishable by law.8).
37. See id. art. 14 (91. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements
or ideas disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated medium
of communication has the right to reply or to make a correction using the same
communications outlet, under such conditions as the law may establish. 2. The
correction or reply shall not in any case remit other legal liabilities that may
have been incurred. 3. For the effective protection of honor and reputation,
every publisher, and every newspaper, motion picture, radio, and television
company, shall have a person responsible who is not protected by immunities
or special privileges.8).
38. See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 9, Jun. 27, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (91. Every individual
shall have the right to receive information. 2. Every individual shall have the
right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.8).
39. See The Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 11, May 26, 1995, 3 I.H.R.R. 1, 212
(1996) (91. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas by any legal means without interference by a public authority and
regardless of frontiers. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions
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Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in 1995, and Article 3040 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted in 1994
and amended in 2004.
Among these instruments, the UDHR and the ICCPR, components of the so-called International Bill of Human Rights, provide the legal basis for the protection of freedom of expression.41
Article 19 of the UDHR provides the foundation for the definition of freedom of expression. It provides: 9Everyone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless oL LrontiersZ842 Article 19 of the ICCPR elaborates on
principles set out in the UDHR.43 Thus, it provides:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either

and restrictions as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, public safety or public order or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.8).
40. See League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 30,
amended May 22, 2004 (91. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and no restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of such
freedoms except as provided for by law. 2. The freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs or to perform religious observances, either alone or in community with others, shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a tolerant society that respects human rights and
freedoms for the protection of public safety, public order, public health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 3. Parents or guardians
have the freedom to provide for the religious and moral education of their children.8).
41. The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the UDHR, ICCPR
and
ICESCR.
See
United
Nations,
PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/protect-human-rights/index.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
42. See UDHR, supra note 19, art. 19.
43. As of now, 169 states are parties to the ICCPR. See United Nations,
Treaty Collection: Status of Treaties: Chapter IV Human Rights: 4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&clang=_en.
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orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only
be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals.44

General Comment No. 34 of the United Nations Human Rights
!o//ittee _9Hu/an ;ights !o//ittee8^ provides authoritative
guidance for the interpretation and application of Article 19 of
the ICCPR.45
:Qholars have desQribed Lreedo/ oL eapression as the 9touQh[
stone oL all rightsZ846 Necessitating this freedom is 9the realization of the principles of transparency and accountability . . . essential for the promotion and protection of human rights.847 Furthermore, freedom of expression provides a basis for the full enjoyment of a wide range of other human rights, such as the rights
to freedom of assembly and association and the right to vote.48
According to Article 19 of the ICCPR, the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds through any
media and regardless of frontiers defines the right to freedom of
expression. This Lreedo/ speQiLiQally inQludes 9politiQal dis[
course, Qo//entary on one’s own and on public affairs, canvassing, discussion of human rights, journalism, cultural and artistic
expression, teaching, and religious discourse, [and] commercial
advertising8 as part oL that Lreedo/Z49
The freedom to seek information and ideas includes active and
investigative journalism of public interest.50 The European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has traditionally interpreted
the freedom to receive information as inclusive of the right of the
44. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 19.
45. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 34,
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).
46. See Kevin Boyle & Sangeeta Shah, Thought, Expression, Association,
and Assembly, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 217, 225 (Daniel Moeckli,
Sangeeta Shah & Sandesh Sivakumaran eds., 2nd ed. 2014).
47. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, supra note 45, ¶ 3.
48. See id. ¶ 4.
49. Id. ¶ 11.
50. See Boyle & Shah, supra note 46, at 226.
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public to be informed and the duty of the media to impart information to the public.51 The ECtHR narrowly construed this freedo/ as prohibiting 9the govern/ent Lro/ restriQting a person
from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to
i/part to hi/Z852 The court noted that the freedom to receive information should not be construed as imposing on the govern/ent 9positive obligations8 to QolleQt and i/part inLor/ation to
the public.53 This court, however, has recently broadened the
scope of the meaning of the freedom to receive information by
interpreting it as generally inclusive of the govern/ent’s obliga[
tions to eliminate the information monopoly barrier created by
the government and not to impede the flow of information sought
by non-state actors, such as nongovernmental agencies or individuals.54 Notably, information subject to the enjoyment of the
freedom to impart information is not confined to that which has
been clearly articulated or affirmatively expressed. This freedom
extends to every form of information and idea expressed orally,
in writing, or artistically.55
The ICCPR does not afford explicit protection to the media.
Nevertheless, given that the rights to freedom of opinion and expression constitute a cornerstone of democratic society, Article
F> should be interpreted as ensuring the /edia’s enJoy/ent oL
these rights.56 The media acts as a watchdog for society, a vital
role Lor de/oQraQy’s dyna/iQ politiQal proQess and interaQtionZ57
The press guarantees the healthy operation of democracy and
LaQilitates Qiti`ens’ partiQipation in the deQision-making process.58 Therefore, states should take effective measures to afford
journalists an appropriate protection from threats, violence, or
51. See Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 13778/88, 14 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 843, ¶ 63 (1992).
52. See Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, ¶ 74
(1987); Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 10454/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep.
36, ¶ 52 (1989); Guerra and Others v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 357, ¶ 53 (1998) [hereinafter Guerra].
53. See Guerra, supra note 52, ¶ 53.
54. See PHILIP LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 378N379 (3rd ed.
2011). See also Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, App. No. 37374/05,
53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 130 (Apr. 14, 2009), ¶¶ 35N37.
55. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 19, ¶ 2.
56. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, supra note 45, ¶ 13.
57. See Boyle & Shah, supra note 46, at 227.
58. See D. J. HARRIS, M. O’BOYLE & C. M. BUCKLEY, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 640 (3rd ed. 2014).
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other acts of harassment against freedom of expression.59 It is
noteworthy that the Human Rights Committee adopted a broad
definition of journalists as 9a wide range of actors including professional full-time reporters and analysts, as well as bloggers
and others who engage in forms of self-publication in print, on
the internet, or elsewhereZ860 This definition created a higher
threshold for the enjoyment of normative immunity by states
from liability to ensure the enjoyment of freedom of expression
by the press, as is necessary to properly perform its ordinary
public function.
III. THE RELATIVE PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
This Part will describe the relative nature of human rights by
detailing the conflicting views regarding the relative protection
of human rights, amidst general consensus of universal respect
for human rights. Specifically, the cultural relativism approach
adopted under the Bangkok Declaration, the San Jose Declaration, and the Tunis Declaration will be contrasted with the Western approach, which asserts that human rights are subject to
absolute protection. This Part will continue by detailing how
freedom of expression can be limited for various reasons, including the necessity of maintaining national security and public order, as demonstrated through a detailed discussion of Norwood
v. the United Kingdom and Robert Faurisson v. France. Finally,
this Part will conclude by engaging in a specific discussion on
how freedom of expression may conflict with freedom of religion.
A. The Relative Nature of Human Rights
The F>>D 3ienna World !onLerenQe on Hu/an ;ights _93i[
enna !onLerenQe8^ Qonvened near the QonQlusion oL the !old War
and spurred passionate debate among Member States of the
United Nations on the universality of human rights.61 Before
this conference, many developing countries had raised the issue
of cultural diversity in Regional Meetings, where they adopted

59. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, supra note 45, ¶ 23.
60. Id. ¶ 44.
61. See Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin
of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391, 407 (2001).
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three landmark declarations: the Bangkok Declaration, the San
Jose Declaration, and the Tunis Declaration.62
The Bangkok Declaration, as adopted at the Regional Meeting
for Asia in April, 1993, announQed that hu/an rights 9/ust be
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of
international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural, and religious baQHgroundsZ863 The San Jose Declaration,
adopted in the Regional Meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean in February F>>D, reQogni`ed 9the enor/ous Qontribution
of indigenous people to the development and plurality of our societies and . . . the value and diversity of their cultures and their
forms of social organization, without detriment to the unity of
the :tateZ864 Finally, the Tunis Declaration, adopted in the Regional Meeting for Africa in November F>>E, proQlai/ed, 9no
ready-made model can be prescribed at the universal level [because] the historical and cultural realities of each nation and the
traditions, standards and values of each people cannot be disregardedZ865 Western countries, including the United States, denounced those declarations about cultural relativism, regarding
them as threats to the validity of international human rights.
Instead, these Western countries asserted the absolute universality of human rights.66 At the Vienna Conference, Western
countries argued that, although relativities and peculiarities of
historical, cultural, and regional backgrounds might be factors
62. See U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, World
Conference on Human Rights, 14N25 June 1993, Vienna, Austria,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ABOUTUS/Pages/ViennaWC.aspx (Nov. 21, 2015).
63. See World Conference on Human Rights, Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, ¶ 8, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8, A/CONF.157/PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G93/125/95/PDF/G9312595.pdf?OpenElement.
64. See World Conference on Human Rights, Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean of the World Conference
on Human Rights, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/LACRM/15,
A/CONF.157/PC/58 (Feb. 11, 1993).
65. See Regional Meeting for Africa of the World Conference on Human
Rights in Tunis, Nov. 2N6, 1992, Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for
Africa of the World Conference on Human Rights, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/AFRM/14, A/CONF.157/PC/ 57 (Nov. 24, 1992).
66. See Christian Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 740, 741 (1994).
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for consideration, they did not justify the derogation of established international norms. After lengthy talks, supporters and
opponents of the Bangkok, San Jose, and Tunis Declarations finally reached a compromise, known as the Vienna Declaration
and Progra//e oL #Qtion _93ienna feQlaration8^, whiQh pro[
vides the following:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent
and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same
footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of
national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it
is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms.67

The Vienna Conference provided an arena for public discourse
on how to balance the universality and relativity of human
rights. The conference also represented a milestone in the formation of international agreements on the ambivalent attributes of human rights. To date, the Vienna Declaration produced
from this conference constitutes the most significant global decision on human rights,68 as numerous states and non-governmental organizations established a plan of action for securing the
goal of universal respect and promotion of fundamental human
rights, while also recognizing certain limitations such as cultural, social, and religious diversity.
B. Statutory Limits of Freedom of Expression
Unlike Article 19 of the UDHR, Article 19(3) of the ICCPR expressly allows for limitations upon freedom of expression. Under
Article 19(3), the exercise of the right to freedom of expression
9Qarries with it speQial duties and responsibilities dand] may be
subJeQt to Qertain restriQtionsZ869 These limitations draw on ArtiQle E>_F^ oL the 7fH;, whiQh provides that 9decveryone has du[
ties to the community in which alone the free and full develop/ent oL his personality is possibleZ8 =nly the legal neQessity to
respect the rights or reputations of others and the necessity to
67. See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993).
68. See SMITH, supra note 19, at 51.
69. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 19, ¶ 3.
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protect national security, public order, or public health or morals
justify the restriction.70
While Article 29(3) of the UDHR states that the right to freedom of expression may never run Qounter to 9the purposes and
prinQiples oL the 7nited Rations,8 #rtiQle EX oL the U!!P; Lur[
ther restricts freedom of expression71 by criminalizing any
speech that amounts to war propaganda and advocates national,
racial, or religious hatred.72 Specifically, Article 20 provides that
any advocacy of ethnic, racial, or religious hatred shall not be
protected under the ICCPR when such hatred is to incite discrimination, hostility, or violence.73 It is noteworthy that these
restrictions are by and large analogous to ones set out in Article
4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in 1965.74 Likewise, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination states that
9dtche prohibition of the dissemination of all ideas based upon
racial superiority or hatred is compatible with the right to freedo/ oL opinion and eapressionZ875
Among a variety of substantive contents, discriminatory expression based on the ethnic origin is apt to invite fairly strict
statutory limitations. Currently, both Islamophobia and antiSemitism are widespread phenomena. The following two cases
touch upon the issues of freedom of expression within those phenomena.
70. Id.
71. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, supra note 45, ¶ 50.
72. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 20. While the term 9war8 may be interpreted as 9war of aggression,8 war propaganda was confirmed in the judgment
by the Nuremberg war tribunal, which stated that war propaganda constituted
an incitement to crimes against humanity. See Juhani Kortteinen, Kristian
Myntti & Lauri Hannikainen, Article 19, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 393, 404 (Gudmundur
Alfredsson & Asjorn Eide eds., 1999).
73. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 20.
74. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 4, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (9States Parties condemn
all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of
superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or
which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any
form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination.8).
75. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XV on Article Four of the Convention No. 15, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 1993).
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A right to freedom of expression may be fundamentally limited
when it is exercised in a way to fuel Islamophobia. In Norwood
v. the United Kingdom, the =swestry Magistrates’ !ourt in "rit[
ain convicted a member of the so-called British National Party,
which was a radical right wing political party, of a crime of displaying hostility to a racial or religious group pursuant to section
5 of the Public Order Act of 1986.76 The defendant, who acted as
a regional organizer for that party, committed the crime by displaying a large poster containing a photograph of the Twin Towers in Lla/es with the phrase 9Usla/ out oL "ritainKProtect the
"ritish People8 in the window of his dwelling and, even after the
post was removed by the police, and continued to engage in discriminatory practices by displaying hostility to Islamic society
through any writing, sign, or other visible representation.77 Section 5 prohibits a person from purposefully or knowingly presenting any discernible form of description, portrayal, or statement in a public or private domain that is 9threatening, abusive
or insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be
caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby.878 The defendant’s charge was found to constitute a statutorily aggravated offence according to sections 28 and 31 of the Crime and Disorder
Act of 1998 (as amended by section 39 of the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act of 2001), which provides that an offence
under section 5 is 96racially or religiously aggravated’ if it is 6motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that
group.’879 London’s High !ourt dis/issed Rorwood’s appeal,
which claimed that convicting him would infringe upon his right
to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.80 The court stated that the poster, among others, in
nature amounted to an overt expression of attack on the Muslim
society as a whole on British soil.81 The ECtHR upheld the
court’s decision by stating that the applicant’s display of the
76. See Norwood v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 23131/03, 40 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 111, 2(2004) [hereinafter Norwood v. the United Kingdom].
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing section 5 of the Public Order Act of 1986).
79. Id. at 3 (citing sections 28(1)(b) and 31(1)(c) of the Crime and Disorder
Act of 1998).
80. Id.
81. Norwood v. the United Kingdom, supra note 76, at 2.
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poster constituted 9vehement attack against a religious group8
associating the Muslim society in its entirety with an act of terrorism.82 The ECtHR found this linkage incompatible with 9the
values proclaimed and guaranteed by the [European Convention
on Human Rights], notably tolerance, social peace and non-discriminationZ883 Accordingly, the ECtHR held that the applicant’s
act fell within the meaning of Article 17 of the Convention, which
could not enjoy the protection of Article 10.84
Moreover, anti-Semitism may cause restraints on a right to
freedom of expression. In Robert Faurisson v. France, the Seventeenth Chamber of the Court of the First Instance of Paris (17th
Chambre Correctionnelle du Tribunal de Grande Instance de
Paris) convicted a French historian of the crime of contesting the
existence of the category of crimes against humanity under the
9Gayssot Act,8 passed by the French legislature in 1990, which
amended the law on the Freedom of the Press of 1881, when he
made a comment denying the occurrence of the Holocaust and
the Act constituted a threat to freedom of research and freedom
of expression.85 Crimes against humanity was 9defined in the
London Charter of 8 August 1945, on the basis of which Nazi
leaders were tried and convicted by the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945NF>CAZ886 The defendant contested the legitimacy of the Act by submitting that it was designed to 9pro/ot[e] the Nuremberg trial and judgment to the
status of dogma, by imposing criminal sanctions on those who
dare to Qhallenge its Lindings and pre/isesZ887 This conviction,
however, was upheld by the Eleventh Chamber of the Court of
Appeal of Paris.88 The court found the lower court to have correctly evaluated in the light of Articles 6 and 10 of the European
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id.; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 25, art. 17
(9Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.8).
85. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Robert Faurisson v France, paras.
2.3, 2.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (Dec. 16, 1996) [hereinafter U.N.
Human Rights Committee, Robert Faurisson v France].
86. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Robert Faurisson v France, supra note
85, ¶ 2.3.
87. Id.
88. Id. ¶ 2.7.
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Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
which provides right to a fair trial and freedom of expression,
respectively.89 This implies that the court viewed the act of the
defendant as falling outside of the legitimate right to freedom of
expression, as Article 10 of the Convention subjects such freedom to restrictions 9as are presQribed by law and are neQessary
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, . . . for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, . . . or for maintaining the authority.890 While the defendant
filed a complaint at the Human Rights Committee by arguing
that the court’s ruling infringed upon his freedom of expression,
the Committee held that Article 19 of the ICCPR justified the
conviction as a reasonable interference with freedom of expression.91 The Committee stated that the complainant instigated
anti-Semitism through his publications and comments by
9seeH[ing] to accuse the Jewish people of having falsified and distorted the facts of the Second World War and thereby having
created the myth of the extermination of the JewsZ892 The Committee found this act to constitute a violation of Article 20 of the
Covenant in the sense that such an act amounted to 9advoQaQy
of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence.893 According to the Com/ittee’s decision, the complainant’s act was to encroach on human rights of the Jewish people and therefore he could not invoke a right to freedom of expression under Article 19 of the Covenant because Article 5 of the Covenant precludes any group or
individual from enjoying and eaerQising 9any right to engage in
activities aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized in the Covenant.894
The traditional discourse on the restriction of freedom of expression also sheds light on an issue of criticism of a religion.
People who hold particular religious beliefs and convictions may
89. Id.
90. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 25, art. 10.
91. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Robert Faurisson v France, supra note
85, ¶ 6.1. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 19.
92. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Robert Faurisson v France, supra note
85, paras. 7.4N7.5.
93. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 20.
94. See ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 5; U.N. Human Rights Committee, Robert Faurisson v France, supra note 85, ¶ 7.4.
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be offended by expressions of others that they find blasphemous.
For example, the aforementioned Danish Cartoon controversy
sparked serious public and scholarly debate about the extent to
which Islamic law may protect freedom of expression.95 A series
of incidents (including that of the Danish Cartoon) led to worldwide protest by Muslims; and, eventually in 2008, the Human
Rights Council of the United Nations (former Commission on
Human Rights) and the General Assembly respectively adopted
resolutions on the restriction of freedom of expression in order
to address the defamation of religions.96
It is noteworthy that the Human Rights Council adopted another resolution with promising language in October 2009, four
/onths aLter 7Z:Z President "araQH =ba/a’s !airo speeQh,
whiQh e/phasi`ed the 7nited :tates’ responsibility to Qounter
negative stereotypes of Islam.97 Introduced by the United States
and Egypt, this resolution does not refer to defamation of religion. Rather, it affirms the rights of individual speech and of the
press and 9highlightdsc the i/portanQe oL those rights in Loster[
ing democratic society and combating intolerance, [emphasizing]
the international legal obligation to respeQt those rightsZ898 This
resolution, however, recognizes 9the moral and social responsibilities of the media . . . [to] combat racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia, and related intolerance.899 It, furthermore, expresses its concern over the worldwide rise oL 9negative raQial
and religious stereotyping8 and condemns 9any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
disQri/ination, hostility or violenQe,8 as provided in Article 20 of
95. See ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SEARCHING
121 (Anver M. Emon, Mark S. Ellis & Benjamin Glahn
eds., 1st ed. 2012).
96. See G.A. Res. 62/154, Combating Defamation of Religions (Mar. 6, 2008);
Human Rights Council Res. 7/36, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/36 (Mar. 28, 2008).
97. See Human Rights Council Res. 12/16 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/16 (Oct.
2, 2009).
98. See John B Bellinger III & Murad Hussain, Freedom of Speech: The
Great Divide and the Common Ground Between the United States and the Rest
of the World, in ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND? 168, 178N179 (Anver M. Emon, Mark S. Ellis
& Benjamin Glahn eds., 1st ed. 2012); Press Release, U.N. Human Rights
Council, Human Rights Council Adopts Six Resolutions and One Decision on
Discrimination Against Women and Freedom of Expression, Among Others
(Oct. 2, 2009), http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/human-rights-counciladopts-six-resolutions-and-one-decision-discrimination-against.
99. See Human Rights Council, supra note 97, ¶ 8.
FOR COMMON GROUND?
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the ICCPR.100 Hence, the resolution exhorts States to take necessary and effective measures to address such concern.101
Adopting a new epoch-making resolution in 2011, the Human
;ights !ounQil shiLted away Lro/ the idea oL 9Qo/bating deLa[
mation oL religions8 in Lavor oL proteQting religious believers
from intolerance and violence.102 This approach seems to be
based on the proposition that it is not the religion itself but religious believers that ought to be protected in the name of freedom
of religion by international human rights law.103 Accordingly,
9blasphe/y laws8 ai/ing to penali`e the /ere deLa/ation oL or
disrespect for a specific religion, if any, are incompatible with
the right to freedom of expression under the ICCPR. 104 Blasphemy laws in more than seventy countries across the world
have been criticized as a government tool for persecuting freedom of religion under the purported pretext to safeguard religions against defamation.105 The 2017 Annual Report of the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom shows that
those countries retaining legislation on blasphemy include
China, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and many Western
European countries, such as Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and Italy, although those European countries
have seldom enforced blasphemy laws.106 For instance, Pakistan’s Penal Code remains the best example of blasphemy laws

100. Id. ¶ 4.
101. Id.
102. See Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18
(Mar. 24, 2011); Boyle & Shah, supra note 46, at 231. See also Robert Evans,
Islamic Bloc Drops 12-year U.N. Drive to Ban Defamation of Religion, REUTERS
(Mar. 24, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2011/03/24/islamic-blocdrops-12-year-u-n-drive-to-ban-defamation-of-religion/.
103. See Evans, supra note 102; Boyle & Shah, supra note 46, at 231.
104. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, supra note 45, ¶ 48 (stating that blasphemy laws are impermissible in that they 9discriminate in favour
of or against one or certain religions or belief systems, or their adherents over
another, or religious believers over non-believers [and] prevent or punish criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and tenets of
faith8).
105. U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2017 ANNUAL
REPORT 2 (Apr. 2017), at http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/annual-report/2017-annual-report.
106. U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note
105, at 34, 48, 54, 62, 71, 76, 84, 121, 144, 160, 192, 212.
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based on the Islamic doctrine.107 Sections 295 and 298 of the
Code 9criminalize acts and speech that insult a religion or religious beliefs or defile the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad, a
place of worship, or religious symbols.8108 Those sections are susceptible to abuse and false accusations, as they do not require
any proof of blasphemous conduct.109 The Report indicates that
a number of individuals, the majority of which falls within the
religious minority communities other than Muslims, have been
sentenced to death or are still serving life sentences for blasphemy charges.110 In General Comment No. 34, the Human
Rights Committee confirmed the incompatibility of blasphemy
laws with the right to freedom of expression, stating that the
ICCPR did not prohibit 9displays of lack of respect for a religion
or other belieL syste/8 unless they went beyond the mere silent
manifestation of personal aversion or dislike and amounted to
the public revelation of religious repugnance or abhorrence that
instigated discrimination, hostility or violence as provided for in
Article 20.111 This meant that the Committee avowedly reaffirmed the global consensus reflected in the 2011 resolution on
the importance of redrawing the line between the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion. In short, the 2011
resolution seems to be the work of normative significance in the
sense that it ad/its to 9legiti/ate QritiQis/ oL religion or [religious] belief8 and QlariLies that Lreedo/ oL eapression /ay be
limited in the context of respect for religions.112 For this reason,
so/e say that this resolution is 9a huge aQhieve/ent beQause Z Z
. it focuses on the protection of individuals rather than religionsZ8113

107. See Reuters Staff, Factbox-Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law Strikes Fear in
Minorities, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2011/03/02/factbox-pakistans-blasphemy-law-strikes-fear-in-minorities.
108. U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note
105, at 62.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. United Nations Human Rights Committee, supra note 45, ¶ 48.
112. See International Federation for Human Rights, UN: Defending the Universality of Human Rights-Priority #HRC29 (Jun. 15, 2015),
https://www.fidh.org/en/international-advocacy/united-nations/un-defendingthe-universality-of-human-rights-priority-hrc29 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
113. See Press Release, Human Rights First, Groundbreaking Consensus
Reached to Abandon Global Blasphemy Code at the United Nations (Mar. 24,
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IV. DISCOURSE ON THE RELATIVE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS
This Part will provide a detailed analysis of cultural relativism, which functions as the governing approach to determine
how the bounds of freedom of expression human rights should
be assessed. This Part will subsequently suggest the 9social integrity8 standard to evaluate whether the cultural relativism approach is admissible. It will provide a profound discussion of the
identity politics and present the significance of the social integrity standard that serves as a general normative base for the
evaluation of the scope of absolute protection of human rights in
a multicultural global community. Finally, this Part will also examine the key questions raised from the application of the social
integrity standard.
A. Cultural Relativism
Two concepts of universalism and absolutism in the context of
discourse on human rights are often interchangeably used, but
they must be semantically distinguished from each other. Absolutism means that human rights are subject to the strict application of uniform governing norms which completely deny exceptional deviation from them. By contrast, universalism in a broad
sense simply captures the theory that human rights are the
same everywhere.114 Thus, it implies that human rights are in
scope and substance common to everyone across the world, but
allows for certain restraints on human rights on the ground of
the protection of social virtues superior to human rights such as
national security and public order, as thoroughly examined in
Part III. Granting that a bright line between those two concepts
can be drawn, universalism in a narrow sense still seems to be
used as a substitute for absolutism. Considering its general familiarity and usage in practice, the term of universalism shown
in the following discussion in Part IV is interpreted as referring
to absolutism so long as it is used in the context of being contrasted with cultural relativism.
2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/groundbreaking-consensus-reached-abandon-global-blasphemy-code-united-nations.
114. See Mark S. Ellis, Islamic and International Law: Convergence or Conflict?, in ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SEARCHING FOR
COMMON GROUND? 91, 97 (Anver M. Emon, Mark S. Ellis & Benjamin Glahn
eds., 1st ed. 2012).
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One of the main challenges to the universality of human rights
lies within cultural relativism based upon a premise that there
exists plural cultures which are not identical to one another.115
Universalism has caused controversy in non-Western societies,
where people may consider and apply concepts of justice and human rights differently than people in Western societies.116 Almost half a century after the adoption of the UDHR, discussion
over the issue of universality versus relativity has raised the
question as to what extent cultural relativism may legitimately
modify the rule of a minimum standard valid for all.117
;elativists Qontend that, 9dtco the 7niversalist, dhu/anc rights
are contingent entirely on their substance, not on where they
Qa/e Lro/ and where they are being appliedZ8118 In response,
moderate Universalists acknowledge that universal rights may
be interpreted differently and applied in different cultures with
good reason.119 Moderate Universalists stress, however, that
9although the right will be Qontingent upon Qulture as a /atter
of application, it is the particular nature of that right that deter/ines how this should be doneZ8120
But, in the debate between universality and relativity, which
theoretical framework is appropriate to understand the attribute of human rights? It should be noted that cultural and religious traditions differ as to their understanding of what fundamental rights are. It is obviously necessary to acknowledge that
the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion sometime clash.121 This conflict, however, cannot imply the rejection
of the universal applicability of human rights law or deny the
115. See SMITH, supra note 19, at 50.
116. See Kathleen Cavanaugh, Narrating Law, in ISLAMIC LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND? 17, 24N
25 (Anver M. Emon, Mark S. Ellis & Benjamin Glahn eds., 1st ed. 2012).
117. See respectively JACK DONNELLY, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984); BURNS H. WESTON, Human Rights and
Nation-Building in Cross-Cultural Settings, 60 ME. L. REV. 317 (2008) [hereinafter WESTON, Nation-Building in Cross-Cultural Settings]; BURNS H. WESTON,
The Universality of Human Rights in a Multicultured World: Toward Respectful Decision-Making, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 65, 66
(Burns H. Weston & Stephen P. Marks eds., 1999).
118. See Ellis, supra note 114, at 97.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Natan Lerner, Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations,
in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: PART 2 79, 130 (Johan D.
van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996).

2017]

Charlie Hebdo and Freedom of Expression

791

need for a minimum international standard for human rights
dynamics.122 # 9QonstruQtive approaQh8 /ay provide a solution
Lor this Qo/plea pu``leZ This approaQh suggests neither 9under[
estimat[ing] the challenge of cultural relativism to the universality of human rights nor conced[ing] too much to [cultural relativis/c Qlai/sZ8123
The late eminent legal scholar Burns H. Weston emphatically
notes that 9any hu/an rights orientation that is not genuinely
in support of the widest possible embrace of the value of respect
in the making and enforcement of human rights norms in a multicultural world is likely to provoke widespread skepticism if not
unreserved hostilityZ8124 He further stresses the cross-cultural
challenge to universalism:
Wirst, not all states, Qertainly not all 9relativist8 states, have
ratified even some of the core international human rights instruments, thus thwarting the pacta sunt servanda argument
ab initio in many if not most instances of relativist-universalist
contestation. . . . Second, while many cultures share common
values, much of international human rights law, particularly
as it relates to suQh 9Lirst generation8 or 9negative8 rights as
are reflected in the ICCPR, may be said to be Western inspired,
thus fueling the conflict rather than resolving it. . . . Third, all
human rights instruments are filled with ambiguity and indeterminacy, sometimes deliberately to ensure signature and ratification. . . . Finally, when their plenipotentiaries are not signing or voting Lor hu/an rights resolutions and treaties 9as
/ere gestures Lor te/porary publiQ relations purposes,8 states,
including those that profess the universality of human rights,
typically hedge their bets by resort to reservations, statements
of understanding, and declarations so as to ensure that certain
practices deemed central to their legal or other cultural traditions will not be rendered unlawful or otherwise anachronistic.125

Cultural relativism hardly constitutes an obvious legal concept; rather, it originates from the intersection of anthropology
and philosophy.126 Hence, construing cultural relativism does
122. Id.
123. See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 3 (1995).
124. WESTON, Nation-Building in Cross-Cultural Settings, supra note 117, at
326.
125. Id. at 326N328.
126. See Cavanaugh, supra note 116, at 25.

792

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 42:2

not simply invite a technical application of stereotyped standards but requires factual inquiries into multicultures of different
values and origins under the approach between empirical analysis and transcendental cognition. This concept, however, does
not exist in a vacuum. Jack Donnelly, a renowned scholar in international studies, argues that cultural relativism is contemplated and applied in a plain manner. He stresses that there are
9a set of doctrines that imbue cultural relativity with prescriptive force.8127 The 1947 Statement on Human Rights of the
#/eriQan #nthropologiQal #ssoQiation states that 9/an is Lree
only when he lives as his soQiety deLines Lreedo/Z8128 Contemporary society is not prone to represent a single culture. Various
cross-border cultures are integrated into the identical society.
The coexistence of disparate cultures restricts a pattern of behavior of social members. With this recognition, the current
global climate attempts to celebrate cultural divergence and heterogeneity.129 As part of the global mandate to promote cultural
diversity across the world, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization adopted the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity at the General Conference for its
thirty-first session in Paris on November 2, 2001.130 The Declaration is the first international instrument reflecting the global
consensus on cultural diversity.131 Article 1 of the Declaration
states that 9cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as
biodiversity is for nature . . . [thus] it is the common heritage of
humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit
127. See Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: Universality, Relative
or Relatively Universal?, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIX DECADES
AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 31, 43 (Mashood A. Baderin & Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds., 2010).
128. American Anthropological Association, 49 American Anthropologist 539,
543
(1947)
http://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/hub/issue/10.1111/aman.1947.49.issue-4/.
129. See SMITH, supra note 19, at 51.
130. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION
[hereinafter UNESCO], Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (Nov. 2,
2001),
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
131. UNESCO, CULTURAL DIVERSITY SERIES NO. 1, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
ON CULTURAL DIVERSITY: A VISION, A CONCEPTUAL PLATFORM, A POOL OF IDEAS
FOR
IMPLEMENTATION,
AND
A
NEW
PARADIGM
3
(2002),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127162e.pdf.
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of present and future generations.8132 The Declaration defines
cultural diversity as being 9embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies8 and being
guaranteed by 9a commitment to human rights and fundamental
freedoms.8133 It emphasizes the sustainability of cultural diversity by recognizing the indivisibility of culture and development.134 Thus, it states that cultural diversity is 9the key to sustainable human development,8 9not si/ply in ter/s oL eQono/iQ
growth, but also as a means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence.8135 More importantly it should be noted that the Declaration makes it clear
that the defense of cultural diversity is 9inseparable from respect
for human dignity.8136 Thus, this is understood as implying that
for the preservation of cultural diversity it is imperative to respect 9human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular
the rights of persons belonging to minorities and those of indigenous peoples.8137 Further to the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, the U.N. General Assembly, in
its Resolution 57/249 in 2003, proclaimed the 21th of May as
World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development.138
As Donnelly explains, by the degree of relativity cultural relativism in a broad sense is divided into three types: radical cultural relativism, strong cultural relativism, and weak cultural
relativis/Z #QQording to radiQal Qultural relativis/, a region’s
culture is the origin of all human rights values. This concept rejects the idea that human rights are independent from society.139
Thus, radiQal Qultural relativis/ holds that a 9hu/an being8 it[
self lacks moral value, and, therefore, the fundamental rights of

132. Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 130, art. 1.
133. Id. arts. 1, 4.
134. Id. art. 3.
135. Id. arts. 3, 11.
136. Id. art. 4.
137. Id.
138. G.A. Res. 57/249, Culture and development, ¶ 4 (Feb. 20, 2003); See
World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development / 21 May,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/events/culturaldiversityday/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
139. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
109 (1st ed. 1989).
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a 9hu/an being8 _iZeZ hu/an rights^ are value neutralZ140 Accordingly, the value of human rights takes different shapes in different societies and, therefore, is not universally construed beyond
societal boundaries. That is to say, radical cultural relativism
does not admit to so-called transsocietal human rights. Strong
cultural relativism, however, relies on the idea that culture is
the most significant but is not the sole element that gives moral
rights or rules meaningful value.141 This concept suggests that
universal standards of human rights are useful only when the
standards function as the key check on excessive relativity.142
Therefore, the concept of strong cultural relativism concerns a
small number of rudimentary rightsKthe universal respect for
which is substantively availableKand a large majority of rights
that subject themselves to relative respect.143 Finally, weak cultural relativism relies on the universality of human rights but
recognizes the functional significance of such concepts as the nature of humanity, the attributes of social community, and the
relativity of individual rights as the key check on excessive universality.144 Therefore, weak cultural relativism admits to universal human rightsKeven if its degree of universality does not
amount to that of radical universalismKwhile rigorously restricting the exceptions of regional diversity and peculiarity.145
In other words, weak cultural relativism allows for broader discretion than radical and strong relativism to judge that a certain
action falls outside of what is considered protected behavior and
infringes on contemporary human rights norms.
On the one hand, cultural relativism appears to criticize the
problem of radical universality based on the universality of human rights. It may properly check the establishment of perilous
moral imperialism that requires every individual moral community to abide by a global uniform standard of morality and deny
the autonomy and self-determination of ethnic and quasi-ethnic
morals. On the other hand, cultural relativism appears vulnerable to the slippery slope argument, which suggests that the denial or exclusion of the universality of human rights, due to the

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 99N100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 100.
Id.
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excessive emphasis of cultural relativism, may lead to the ultimate dissolution of universal value of human rights.
In any case, human rights should be universally respected,
even if they are subject to relative protection under cultural relativism. The conceptual underpinnings of human rights are both
universal and relative. Hence, a far-fetched argument that the
accumulated facts of history show that the current regime of universal human rights has often been used to bolster Western cultural dominance is no more or less the misconception of Universalism.146 This misconception merely comes from a universalitybiased understanding of the issue. A more holistic analysis of
human rights in the context of cultural relativism calls upon the
global community to maintain universal respect for human
rights and vigilantly check the rise of moral imperialism.
B. The “Social Integrity” Standard for the =valuation of
Normative Admissibility of Cultural Relativism
It is self-evident that the global community should universally
respect human rights. The corollary, however, does not require
that the global community absolutely protect them under all circumstances. Human rights are subject to statutory limitations
and challenges of cultural relativism. Long-standing debates
over cultural relativism remain controversial. In particular, discourse on cultural relativism in the context of international human rights law has raised a difficult question, that is, 9to what
extent should cultural relativism serve as a controlling norm to
restrict the absolute protection of human rights?8 Absent easy
answers to this *uestion, fonnelly’s hypothesis provides useLul
guidance with a new paradigm for understanding human
rights.147 This paradigm prompts us to explore the content,
reach, and bounds of human rights on the basis of a three-step
approach: first, understand the substantive meaning of human
rights; second, interpret specific human rights; and third, resolve how to honor and implement these rights.148 Donnelly
notes that at the first step, cultural diversity scarcely justifies
any derogation of the universality of human rights.149 Further,
he explains that, while cultural diversity constitutes exceptional
146.
147.
148.
149.

See Ellis, supra note 114, at 97.
See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 45 (4th ed. 2013).
Id. at 37.
Id.
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justification at the second step, there is substantial room for favorable consideration of cultural diversity at the third step.150
Thus, his hypothesis holds that acknowledgment of the challenges of cultural relativism has a role in interpreting and applying specific human rights.
Cultural relativism does not require evaluation of whether the
culture is compatible with public order and social mores, as the
global community has generally accepted. This concept requires
evaluation of the significance and value of culture in the society
and how the culture has contributed to the internal integration
of society; cultural relativism implies that human rights may not
be subject to complete protection in the society where the culture
strongly resists limitless enjoyment and exercise of human
rights because such protection is at odds with the fundamental
integrity of that society.
The term of social integrity, as a key standard for the evaluation of the normative admissibility of cultural relativism in human rights discourse, does not exist in a vacuum. This concept
is derived from discourse on identity politics. Identity politics is
based on the notion that 9identity Qlai/s do represent a legiti[
/ate Lor/ oL politiQal disQourse din soQietycZ8151 Margaret Moore,
a renowned scholar in political studies, notes that the concept of
identity generally performs three key functions in the context of
intra-societal group relations: 9/e/bership, diLLerentiation and
a subJeQtive or inner identiLiQationZ8152 Specifically, membership
to a particular group denotes that personal identity exposes one
to others at the initial step of the relation-building process.153
fiLLerentiation /eans that 9dpersonalc identity Lor/dingc in Qon[
trast to others8 reinLorQes the sense oL /e/bershipZ154 A subjective or inner identification i/plies that 9dpersonalc identity ea[
ists as a subjective or internalized perspective of what makes
one’s liLe intelligible and /eaningLulZ8155 Moore further explains
that 9dpersonalc identity is linHed with one’s sense oL selL, or one’s

150. Id.
151. See Margaret Moore, Identity Claims and Identity Politics: A Limited
Defence, in IDENTITY, SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 27, 38 (Igor Primoratz & Aleksandar Pavkovic eds., 2006).
152. Id. at 28.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 28N29.
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integrity as a personZ8156 ThereLore, 9enLorQing rules and poliQies
that violate people’s identity, or re*uire people to aQt Qontrary to
what they regard as Qentral to their sense oL selL8 Qalls Lor QareLul
attention.157 This notion of personal identity applies to so-called
collective identityKthe identity embodied by society.158 That is,
collective identity is integral to the society or its members as a
whole, not to the individual. It is noteworthy that collective identity matters in inter-societal group relations as personal identity
generally does in intra-societal group relations.
The modern societal scramble for hegemony precipitates one
of the problems of identity politics. A sharp ideological conflict
between the East professing socialism and the West advocating
liberal democracy characterized the Cold War era. This fight for
hegemonyKnot unprecedented but still far-reachingKforeshadowed the clash between the two contrasting identities deeply
rooted in the East and the West. The victory of Western hegemony completely shattered the collective identity integral to Eastern society. The wide diffusion of identity politics that emerged
after the collapse of the Cold War regime posed a significant
challenge to Western-oriented cultureKunderlying a contemporary new world order underpinned by neoliberalism and liberal
democracyKbased on globalization, individualism, and consumptive capitalism, which are predicated upon human rights
of universal quality.159 The mode of behaviors by which identity
politics manifest themselves may vary from the nonviolent protests of Martin Luther King Jr.160 to radical exclusivism and violence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS.
156. Id. at 29.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 31.
159. It is noteworthy that the concept of 9liberal democracy8 is susceptible to
various interpretations. A critical view indicates that this concept raises the
so-called 9authoritarian opinion8 concern in that extremely biased liberal democracy overstressing the significance of public consensus may take on totalitarianism that forbids not being a democrat. See ALAIN BADIOU, METAPOLITICS
78 (Jason Barker trans., 1st ed. 2005), cited in Alessandro Zagato, Imagination
of Violence and Surrogates for Politics, in THE EVENT OF CHARLIE HEBDO:
IMAGINARIES OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 43, 44 (Alessandro Zagato ed., 1st ed.
2015).
160. On August 28, 1963, Martin Luther King Jr. pursued his great dream
that 9[all men would] not be judged by the color of their skin but the content of
their character.8 See Martin Luther King Jr., 9I Have a Dream8 Speech Delivered at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington D.C. (Aug. 28, 1963).
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The bottom line, however, is that, in identity politics, context
such different modes of behaviors may be, at their core, considered attempts by social groups to secure their identities by
fighting against Western cultural dominance.
It should be noted that identity politics may have a semantic
link to decolonization. Details may blur the distinction between
identity politics and decolonization. The expansion of the concept of identity politics to the traditional history of power politics
may state that the collective manifestation of common sovereign
rights of indigenous peoples in colonial countries in the form of
aggregated identity claims has contributed to gradual demise of
global imperialism on a regional or worldwide basis. This notion
is based on an understanding that identity politics is construed
as including the invocation of individual sovereign rights or national sovereign power. Indeed, it seems that there in nature exists an overlap between decolonization and identity politics in
that the former represents the restoration of common identity
characterized as national sovereignty, which remains under the
suppression of dominant colonial power while the latter reflects
public backlash against coerced, strict conformity to uniform
identity and promotes the social integration based on heterogeneous interests emerging in the contemporary era of diverse
identity. Here, it is noteworthy that Articles 73 and 74 of the
U.N. Charter recognize that the interests of the inhabitants of
[dependent] territories are paramount, and bind all U.N. Member States to obligations to promote the well-being of those inhabitants in political, social, economic, educational, and commercial matters and particularly assist them in developing selfgovernment to establish free political institutions.161 For the progressive development of this decolonization mandate, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted, in 1960, the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
commonly known as the Declaration on Decolonization.162 It proclaims that all people have the right to self-determination and
the right to complete independence, which are all embraced by
equal fundamental human rights as affirmed in the U.N. Charter and the UDHR.163 The right to self-determination ensures
that all people 9Lreely deter/ine their politiQal status and Lreely
161. See U.N. Charter arts. 73N74.
162. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960).
163. Id.; U.N. Charter art. 1; UDHR, supra note 19.
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pursue their economic, social and cultural development . . . on
the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of
all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and
their territorial integrityZ8164 Thus, from a contextual perspective, it Qan be said that 9the principles of equal rights and selfdeter/ination8 underlying deQoloni`ation /ove/ents represent
the virtue analogous to the one pursued by identity politics,
which is described as aiming at simulating people to free themselves from the shackles of the universal obtrusion of rigid
standardized identity, in other words, motivating them to resist
the governing regime denying the coexistence of diverse identities that play a pivotal role in connecting people with the same
identity to one another. In short, the common locomotive value
driving both identity politics and decolonization leads to the collective defiance by the underrepresented and suppressed people
against the collective obliteration of human rights to the diverse
identity, respectively. This implication, however, cannot be interpreted as overstating the conceptual relationship between
identity politics and decolonization. They cannot be understood
as serving a corollary to each other. From a sociopolitical perspective, the former concept originates in the discourse on interor intra- societal relations background and by contrast the latter
necessarily invites discussions of the legitimate sovereign rights
and national sovereign power within the meaning of public international law.
Today it seems no more controversial that inter-societal group
conflict of heterogeneous identities in the context of international relations is not an issue of right or wrong, but one of toleranQe oL diLLerent peoples’ identitiesZ WrenQh philosopher 3ol[
taire stresses throughout one oL his inLluential booHs, 9Treaties
on ToleranQe,8 that the spirit oL toleranQe Qalls upon the publiQ
to recognize that all humans have different commitments and
identities deserving of equal respect.165 As Moore puts it, constructive discussion for dissolution of identity conflict should not
9ad/it oL the Hind oL `ero-sum relation [between social groups
with different identities] that critics argue is a central feature of
identity politiQsZ8166 Thus, the appropriate form of identity claim

164. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 162.
165. VOLTAIRE, supra note 1.
166. See Moore, supra note 151, at 39.
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must not employ an extreme form of practice of excluding a social group with a heterogeneous identity from the common community in the name of cultural relativism. This reflects no more
than the radical cultural relativism and fall afoul of the principle
of live-and-let-live. The exploration of a just and ideal doctrine
to ensure the coexistence of diverse identities and universal respect for human rights boils down to the relative universality of
human rights. Under this overarching doctrinal umbrella, the
degree of the practice of exercising human rights is precluded
from going beyond minimum limitation standards, which are determined or ascertained through the process of reaching a national or international consensus as to the legitimate scope of
human rights, for example as set out in various international
instruments introduced in Part III. It is noteworthy that social
justice serves as a legitimate standard in embodying the relative
universality of human rights in the capacity of a good supplement to normative limitations, which were set forth in those instruments and established in the case law. In his magisterial
worH titled 9# Theory oL TustiQe,8 Tohn ;awls, the late renowned
contemporary political philosopher, provides a lucid articulation
of his profound intuition on what social justice calls upon citizens in a free society to do.167 He acknowledges that individual
liberty and fundamental rights may be subject to limitations derived from the principle of the common interest in public order
and security.168 He conceptualizes the common interest as the
9interest oL the representative e*ual Qiti`enZ8169 In other words,
he explains that these limitations do not imply that public interests are placed over liberty and individual interests.170 Rather,
he stresses that from a contractual standpoint, the government
as the Qiti`ens’ agent is to have been endowed with a enabling
right to maintain public order and security, which was necessary
to accomplish its duty to ensure the establishment of fair, wellordered soQiety Lor every Qiti`en’s pursuit oL his individual inter[
ests and well-being.171 Rawls bases restraints of human rights of
others, especially the intolerant sects on the principle of justice
as 9a Just Qonstitution with the liberties of equal Qiti`enship8
whiQh is QharaQteri`ed as 9the end oL politiQal aQtion by reLerenQe
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 216N221 (1971).
Id. at 212N213.
RAWLS, supra note 167, at 213.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 212N213.
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to whiQh praQtiQal deQisions are to be /adeZ8172 The principle of
justice endows just citizens with a legitimate right to self-preservation, allowing for deviation from the complete tolerance of others.173 Therefore, tolerant citizens in well-ordered just society
have 9the right not to tolerate the intolerant Z Z Z when they sin[
cerely and with reason believe that intolerance is necessary for
their own seQurityZ8174 Conversely, the intolerant’s Lreedo/ to in[
voke tolerance is fundamentally restricted by the existence of
the imminent danger to both social security and equal liberties
of other tolerant citizens.175
Notably, the aforementioned discussions underpin the significance of the social integrity standard that serves as a general
normative base for the evaluation of the scope of absolute protection of human rights in a multicultural global community.
Thus, cultural relativism takes concrete shape within the concept of social integrity. This concept may have anti-Western or
dictatorial overtones in some sense. Historically speaking, men
in power without general public support have invoked social integrity as a justification for human rights violations. Consider,
for example, how South Korea committed massive and nationwide human rights violations that were in the name of social assimilation and cohesion ra/pant under 9the /ilitary-backed,
authoritarian regi/es8 Lro/ the late F>CXs to the late F>?Xs, un[
til civil protests for democracy lead to its demise.176 Furthermore, while the concept of social integration is susceptible to various interpretations, it may serve as a last resort to reinforce
national security or the power base of the ruler.177 This is evident
in cases where cultural peculiarity generally dictates social identity, and social identity contributes to the reinforcement of social
cohesion from a socio-cultural perspective. For example, modern
and contemporary history shows that many political leaders in

172. Id. at 219N220.
173. Id. at 218.
174. Id. at 218.
175. Id. at 220.
176. See Susan Chira, South Korea’s Politics of Prosperity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
6, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/06/business/south-korea-s-politicsof-prosperity.html?pagewanted=all.
177. See Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The
Evolving Debates about “Values in Asia,” 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 24
(2003).
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several Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, have sought to invoke so-called 9#sian values8 to step up
political governance and strengthen social solidarity.178 Asian
values can be generally interpreted as embracing 9authoritarianism, cooperation, harmony, and order as the predominant values of Asian cultures.8179 Those leaders have claimed Asian values to advance a policy agenda for authoritarian regime.180 The
political practice of attributing authoritarianism to Asian values
takes the form of subordinating the individual to the group, liberty to authority and rights to responsibility.181 Thus, proponents of Asian values proclaim the significance of the social identity in establishing durable political governance and stabilizing
governing structure. Employing the collective virtue of the society to that end entails a wide range of restriction of individual
human rights, rigorous endorsement of cultural peculiarity, and
thereby resistance to cultural intervention in the society. It
should be noted that these claims do not advocate an extreme
form of authoritarianism or totalitarianism, which forms the
ideological backbone of socialist states, including North Korea,
China, and Vietnam.182 With exceptions to those states, for other
countries with the history of authoritarian regimes, social identity in the shape of cultural identity served as the underpinning
base for Asian values.
In short, a conflation of diverse individual virtues as the collective virtue does not guarantee a just society but rather it is
vulnerable to a potential risk in that it may serve as an ideological instrument serving political schemes for legitimizing unjust
state violence or strengthening governance. This is obviously a
fait accompli. Nonetheless, the functional significance of social
integration in human rights discourse should be neither overlooked nor negated because the cognizable degree of social collaboration and cohesion is a useful guide for the cultural relativism standard. The application of the social integrity standard
prompts two questions: first, what constitutes fundamental values of social integrity; and second, is this standard properly applicable where the enjoyment and exercise of human rights by
178. Id. at 54.
179. Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate
over Human Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109, 109 (1998).
180. Id. at 110.
181. Id. at 111.
182. Id. at 115.
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an individual or group in a certain society challenge social identity born of common language, history, and culture, which society represents in its entirety?
First, fundamental values of social integrity may differ depending on the ethnic, religious, and cultural societal peculiarities. Clarifying what human rights are involved is also important in searching for fundamental values. These may take
various shapes, such as public interest, social order, democracy,
social identity, the right to self-determination, the legitimacy of
a regime, and so forth. Second, traditional discussions of international human rights have mainly focused on whether the national human rights regime properly secures effective domestic
implementation of international norms. Human rights issues,
however, are apt to be far diverse and complex in nature. Some
may touch upon cultural collision, dissemination, and intervention beyond the border of the country or society in which the culture historically originates. For example, various legal issues
raised in the Charlie Hebdo incident include a crash between
traditional culture of an immigrant Islamic society in France
and that of French mainstream society. Thus, this issue in nature falls inside of a de facto cross-border conflict of multi-cultures that have different values from one another and are based
on different geo-historical origin. It raises a fundamental question of whether it is just under the international human rights
law to offend the collective minds of minority society members
by measuring the value of the culture of that society against a
set of cultural criteria established in the mainstream society
when those societies have heterogeneous cultural origin. When
a certain underlying human rights issue is of transnational nature, the rigid and narrow interpretation of the social integrity
standard may lead to an argument that this standard is subject
to limited application, so long as such an issue contains little or
temporary concern that a cultural conflict appearing to occur beyond the border may result in fundamental impediment to social
cohesion or assimilation in the relevant society. But, the crossborder issue underlying the Charlie Hebdo incident does not
seem to fall within this case, as the satirized Islamic culture was
not a culture newly disseminated into France but was playing
the pivotal role of hardening the collective unity of the minor
immigrant society, which had already taken root on French soil,
and tying individual members of the society together. The social
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integrity standard, however, is of normative significance because it fills a gap in current international human rights law by
serving as a non-statutory norm for interpreting and restricting
human rights in the context of cultural relativism. As previously
stated, this standard merely asks us to look into the relevant
society and judge how firmly the cultural identity at issue is integral to that society. Hence, it is important to understand that
the social integrity standard is susceptible to extraterritorial application when heterogeneous cultures of different societies are
in conflict.
CONCLUSION
In this era of undisputable cultural diversity, the Charlie
Hebdo controversy reveals the difficulty in creating a society
where any negative opinion can be unlimitedly tolerated in the
name of freedom of expression. Indeed, such an illusory society
would exist, more likely than not, in the utopia. Even if we assume that there might exist one on this mundane sphere, it
would be short-lived because society, absent from a minimal restraint mechanism, is fragile against and vulnerable to the internal collapse of the social basis due to the growing polarity between conflicting opinions, which results from a sequence of actions and reactions in a vicious circle, such that an expression of
a thought brings out negative feedback and then it is challenged
by another counter-thought. Without a reasonable limitation of
negative opinions, this chain effect would reveal the frailty of the
societal normative regime, which was established to preserve
freedom of expression as a fundamental human right of the universal nature. Consequently, it follows that the society would
end up with the frustration or disruption of its human rights
mechanism.
Here, whether Charlie Hebdo’s satire oL an Usla/iQ taboo Lalls
outside the scope of absolute protection of freedom of expression
still remains controversial. Nonetheless, a moderate view of cultural relativism in human rights discourse suggests that human
rights are subject to restrictions when the society faces a serious
threat to its internal assimilation and cohesion. This suggestion
implies that the concept of human rights needs to be construed
as admitting neither complete exclusion nor unconditional endorsement of cultural relativism. In other words, human rights
should be universally respected but not absolutely protected all
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the time. They may be subject to restrictions pursuant to the social integrity standard in the name of cultural relativism. The
current international human rights normKdelimited by minimum limitation requirements set forth by a variety of international human rights laws and a certain range of marginal discretion of each stateKis susceptible to interpretation that allows
a human rights policy to be modified to secure sufficient flexibility, taking into consideration diverse social, cultural, and moral
values in the multicultural context.
Revisiting the human rights issue at the heart of the Charlie
Hebdo incident from a perspective of cultural relativism calls for
reevaluation of Islamic society, which was insulted by Charlie
Hebdo’s publiQ satire oL the prophet Moha//adZ 7nliHe West[
ern societies, Islamic society is not a secular society; rather, it
grows from roots of united politics and religion. Islam represents
more than just a religion for many people in Islamic society and
provides the foundation of ethnic, cultural, and religious identities that are collectively integral to Islamic society. Islam also
serves as a substantive ground to legitimize national authority
and a fundamental value to sustain national and social regimes.
Considering the social values and the status of Islam thus leads
to the conclusion that freedom of expression may necessarily and
properly be restricted to maintain the social integrity of Islamic
countries in the application of uniform standards of human
rights.
The relative universality of human rights rejects blind normative conformity across the cultural spectrum and respects cultural diversity. While invariable universal values are doubtlessly inherent to human rights, their interpretation and enjoyment should not disregard peculiar cultural identities integral
to their respective societies because mores and habits of thought
and behavior tend to quickly spread and remain deeply rooted in
the society. It should be noted, however, that this view does not
refute but rather patently endorses the dicta that any restraint
on fundamental human rights, whether statutory or customary,
should rarely be allowed, should be de minimis level, and should
only be invoked under compelling circumstances. The new paradigm of the bounds of freedom of expression clearly complements
the dominant global human rights policy. The proposed set of
concepts of freedom of expression serves as a normative underpinning of international human rights law by reinforcing longstanding core principles in their entirety, not negating them.
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The implementation of such human rights principles in the
framework of the proposed paradigm may effectively strike the
balance between individual interest of asserting a right to freedom of expression and collective interest of keeping common sociocultural value intact from external encroachment for the
preservation of social integrity.

